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Abstract
Exploiting data on product-destination level transactions of a large panel of Italian firms, we
provide new evidence on the effect of financial constraints on price variation across exporters.
Controlling for firm characteristics and endogeneity, constrained exporters charge higher prices
than unconstrained firms exporting in the same product-destination market. The positive price
difference increases with horizontal differentiation of products, while it reduces in vertically dif-
ferentiated products, where there is more scope for quality adjustments. The results are consistent
with constrained firms exploiting demand rigidities to keep prices up in the attempt to sustain
revenues and escape the constraints.
JEL codes: F10, F14, F36, G20, G32, L25
Keywords: financial constraints, export prices, horizontal and vertical differentiation, quality
adjustment
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1 Introduction
Informational asymmetries and imperfect screening in capital or credit markets give raise to situ-
ations where financing constraints prevent potentially successful and growth enhancing projects or
businesses to be undertaken. There are a few reasons why access to finance plays a particularly im-
portant role for firms involved in export activities (Manova et al., 2011). Fixed and variable costs tend
to be higher for exporters than for domestic producers, due to the need to build ad-hoc distributional
networks, to acquire specific information on destination markets, to customize products, or to the
mere transportation of goods. Moreover, the time lag between production and the actual realization
of the corresponding revenues is typically longer for exporters, and international sales contracts are
usually more complex, riskier and less enforceable than the domestic ones. It is building upon these
ideas that an increasing number of empirical papers has recently focused on the effects of financial
frictions on firms’ export activities. The bulk of these works focus on extensive and intensive mar-
gins of exports, showing that financial constraints are critical determinants of trade in many respects.
Constraints reduce firms’ ability to enter international markets and the volume of trade, and limit the
exporters’ product scope as well as the number of trade partners.1
The relationship between constraints or credit markets imperfections and export prices is much
less investigated, and this is particularly unfortunate. First, there is no reason why one should only
focus on the margins of exports, as indeed financial constraints can distort firms’ pricing strategies just
as they affect firms’ choices along the extensive and intensive margins. And actually, adjusting prices
represent in a sense an even more natural strategic instrument in response to financing problems.
Indeed changing prices is in principle faster and easier than adjusting capacity, quantities or the scope
of product/geographical diversification, although of course a number of factors such as the strength
of competition, demand characteristics, quality and others might all influence the scope to maneuver
on prices effectively.
Second, understanding the influence of constraints on export pricing is of great relevance also
for the impact likely induced at the aggregate industry or economy-wide level. Indeed, the grow-
ing literature on firms’ heterogeneity in international trade emphasizes that changes in prices play a
crucial role in linking trade liberalization to aggregate productivity dynamics. Fiercer import compe-
tition induced by the opening up of trade forces firms to adjust prices and profits, triggering a process
of market shares reallocation that leads to sectoral productivity improvements. By affecting export
prices, financial frictions may influence this reallocation process. Moreover, recent evidence linking
micro patterns to macro dynamics suggests that financial constraints cause firms to contribute to the
exchange rate disconnect (Strasser, 2013). Indeed, export prices of financially constrained firms are
more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations, with important implications not only for firms’ compet-
itiveness, but also for monetary policy, macroeconomic stability, and more generally for the welfare
1Consistent results are presented in Muuls (2008) for Belgium, in Bellone et al. (2010) for France, in Minetti and Zhu
(2011) for a cross-section of Italian firms, and in Li and Yu (2009) and Manova et al. (2011) for Chinese firms. The only
contrasting evidence is in Greenaway et al. (2007) for UK, where the probability of entry into exporting is not affected
by financing problems, and in Berman and Hricourt (2010), where financing problems do not influence export values in a
sample of nine developing countries.
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of producers and consumers.2
This paper contributes to the literature by providing an exhaustive analysis of the role that limited
access to external finance plays in influencing price variation across exporting firms and by uncover-
ing the main factors operating behind this relationship. The work exploits an original Italian database
obtained by merging balance sheets information with a transaction-level dataset recording custom
information on values and quantities involved in each export transaction performed by a firm, broken
down by product and destination country. The key advantage of our dataset is that it includes both a
proxy of the price charged by each firm for each product-destination transaction, and an informative
firm-level measure of access to credit. The latter is based on a credit rating index internal to and heav-
ily used within the Italian banking system, and available for all the firms in the dataset. Compared to
alternative proxies of financial constraints, either based on firm financial conditions measured through
balance sheets variables or on surveys eliciting whether firms perceived themselves as constrained,
credit ratings can provide a cleaner identification of the actual situation where a firm faces an inelastic
credit supply schedule, and no possibility to resort to external finance. Indeed, by incorporating the
credit markets’ view and attitude towards potential borrowers, credit ratings measure the actual way
investors’ decide to provide external finance. Some peculiar features of the specific rating index used
in the paper make it particularly relevant and tightly linked with the supply and cost of credit.
While few other recent works look at the relationship between financial constraints and export
pricing, this paper represents, to the best of our knowledge, the only attempt to explicitly control for
possible endogeneity bias due to omitted variables or reverse causality. To overcome these potential
problems and to achieve a proper identification, we adopt an instrumental variable strategy. Following
an established practice in the empirical studies on Italy, we use historical information about changes
in the Italian banking regulation to identify exogenous variation to the local (province level) supply
of banking services (Guiso et al., 2004; Minetti and Zhu, 2011). Precisely, we resort to exogenous
variation in provincial credit supply determined by the progressive removal, during the 1990s, of a
series of restrictions to banking services introduced in 1936 by the Bank of Italy.
Our main result is that financial constraints play a relevant role in influencing export pricing.
Firms facing tighter credit conditions charge higher prices than unconstrained firms exporting an
equal product to the same destination. Such “price-premium” for constrained exporters holds even
when controlling for a set of firm-level characteristics, and it is robust to a series of sensitivity analyses
concerning different validations of the instruments and different sub-samples.
This finding can be interpreted in light of the price-constraints link predicted by diverse theories.
Outside the international trade literature, models of competition in markets with demand rigidities
(see Klemperer, 1995, for a review) stress that charging higher prices is just a way, for firms facing
shortage of credit, to fulfill the need to keep operations and meet current liabilities. The key point is
that there must be strong enough frictions in the product market allowing to increase prices without
loosing too much of the demand, at least in the short run. Within the micro-trade literature, models
extending the standard Melitz (2003) framework (see Fan et al., 2012, for a framework encompassing
2The current crisis and the related contraction of international trade make the investigation of the mechanisms relating
finance to firm’s export pricing even more topical. See Amiti and Weinstein (2011), Levchenko et al. (2010), Feenstra
et al. (2011) and Chor and Manova (2012) for recent evidence of the role of financial constraints in restricting trade flows.
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other attempts) suggest that two opposing channels shape the impact of financial constraints on export
prices. A price distortion effect that, similarly to the demand-friction mechanism, comes from the
ability of constrained firms to charge higher prices exploiting product market rigidities. And a quality
adjustment effect: constrained firms cannot afford the costs of quality and thus sell lower quality
goods at lower prices. Finally, one can envisage a third mechanism, common to all theories: a simple
costs effect inducing constrained firms to set higher export prices just because they operate at higher
unit costs.
We find that the price premium for constrained firms survives after controlling for the costs chan-
nel. Further, we show that the price premium for constrained firms is larger in more horizontally
differentiated products, where one expects that there is more room to leverage on price rigidities,
while it is smaller, although still positive, in more vertically differentiated products, where there is
more scope for quality adjustment. Overall, therefore, the findings suggest that both the price distor-
tions related to demand rigidities and the quality adjustment effect play a role, but the distortion effect
is dominant. This represents a challenge for existing trade models, as they can explain this result only
within a framework where quality is exogenous.
Within the vast empirical literature on firm heterogeneity in international trade, this article more
directly relates to the scarce works that focus on the impact of financial frictions on pricing strate-
gies. Manova et al. (2011), using Chinese custom data, find two contrasting results: while MNC
affiliates set lower export prices in financially vulnerable sectors, joint ventures have higher unit val-
ues in the same industries. Fan et al. (2012), using the same data, provide evidence that firms in
sectors with higher external finance dependence set, on average, lower prices. These papers rely
on industry-level rather than on firm-level measures of financial constraints, and do not control for
possible endogeneity of financial constraints. Our analysis overcomes both limitations.
The work also relates to the growing empirical literature documenting the systematic variation in
export prices across firms, products and trade partners (Bastos and Silva, 2010; Manova and Zhang,
2012a; Harrigan et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2012). These studies directly link export prices to firm
characteristics including productivity, size, capital intensity, and the skill composition of workers. By
contrast, our study reveals that firm financial conditions represent a further crucial determinant of
product-destination export prices.
2 Data and descriptive analysis
This Section presents the data and provides descriptive evidence on the relationship between the proxy
of financial constraints (FCs) and the main variables.
The Data
The analysis combines three sources of data: the Italian Foreign Trade Statistics (Commercio Estero,
hereafter COE) and the Italian Register of Active Firms (Archivio Statistico Imprese Attive, ASIA),
both collected by the Italian Statistical Office (ISTAT), and a firm level accounting dataset, which is
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available through ISTAT but collected by the Italian Company Account Data Service (Centrale dei
Bilanci, CB).3
The major advantage of matched firm-trade data is that they enable to directly relate export prices
to firm attributes. The COE dataset is the official register of all trade flows of Italy. It records
separately the value (in Euros) and the quantity (in kilos) involved in each export and import cross-
border transaction performed by a firm, thus allowing to compute export and import prices (unit
values). As standard with this kind of custom-level data, we compute unit values as the ratio between
the value and the physical quantity of each export transaction. Because the reported value of exports
excludes the cost of insurance and freight, the unit price of exports is a free-on-board (f.o.b) price.4
Traded products are classified at the six digit level of the Harmonised System (HS6) classification.
The data available to the present study cover the period 2000-2003, for a total of 5, 329 product
categories exported in 236 different destination countries.
The ASIA register covers the universe of Italian firms active in the same time span, irrespective of
their export status. It reports annual figures on number of employees, sector of main activity (accord-
ing to European NACE industrial classification) and geographical location of the firms (municipality
of principal activity or legal address).
The CB dataset collects annual administrative reports for all Italian limited liability firms. The
long term institutional role of CB ensures high data quality, limiting measurement error.5
By merging these three data sources, we obtain a dataset that covers the entire population of Italian
limited firms (exporters and non exporters) over the period 2000-2003. We focus on manufacturing
firms. Compared to the overall population of manufacturing firms, in 2003 our dataset covers 21%
of firms, about 59% of all manufacturers that do export, and 84% of the total value of exports, and
similar values are observed for the other years. The main limitation of the sample rests in a mild
over-representation of bigger and more productive firms.6
Further, since the short time span available and the inclusion of lagged variables place limits to
the exploitation of time variation, our main analysis considers time-series averages of the relevant
variables between 2000-2001 and between 2002-2003, respectively for those variables entering in the
regression models at time t − 1 and t. This avoids an arbitrary choice of a single year, and allows to
smooth for possible individual year shocks. The final sample includes a total of 117, 747 firms.
Column 2 of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics about the sample characteristics in terms of key
control variables employed in the following regression analysis. These include size measured by the
number of employees, age computed by the year of foundation, a TFP measure (in logs) obtained via
the IV-GMM modified Levinsohn-Petrin estimator proposed in Wooldridge (2009), and two variables
3The data were accessed at the ISTAT facilities in Rome, and have been made available after careful screening to avoid
disclosure of individual information.
4ISTAT collects data on exports based on individual transactions. The European Union sets common rules for data
collection across countries, but leaves some flexibility to member states. See the Appendix for a detailed description of
requirements for inclusion in the Italian export data.
5CB was founded as a joint agency of the Bank of Italy and the Italian Banking Association in the early 1980s to
assist in supervising risk exposure of the Italian banking system. Today part of the leading group in business information
services in Italy, during the sample period CB was a private company owned by major Italian banks which exploited its
services in gathering and sharing information about firms.
6See Tables A1 and A2 in the Appendix for further details on the data sources and their coverage.
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Table 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Our sample - Number
of firms
Our sample -
Averages
Difference between FC
and non-FC firms
(1) (2) (3)
Panel A - All firms
Number of firms 117,747
Number of FC firms 20,598
Number of employees 27.141 -0.610∗∗∗ (0.013)
Age 14.494 -0.492∗∗∗ (0.008)
log TFP 2.588 -0.436∗∗∗ (0.009)
Total Assets 6,209 -0.755∗∗∗ (0.012)
Gross operating margin 566.3 -2.258∗∗∗ (0.016)
Panel B - Exporters
Number of firms 53,174
Number of FC firms 6,815
Number of employees 47.777 -0.709∗∗∗ (0.017)
Age 17.471 -0.555∗∗∗ (0.014)
log TFP 2.772 -0.453∗∗∗ (0.013)
Total Assets 11,714 -0.679∗∗∗ (0.019)
Gross operating margin 1,086 -2.552∗∗∗ (0.029)
Notes:
Panel A - Column 1: number of firms and number of FC firms in the sample, all years. Column 2: 2000-2001
averages of number of employees, age, Wooldridge (2009) modified Levinsohn-Petrin TFP, total assets, and gross
operating margins, all computed across all firms in the sample. Column 3: difference in means between constrained
and unconstrained firms in the sample via log-OLS regressions of 2000-2001 averages of firms’ characteristics on
the FC dummy, controlling for 3-digit industry.
Panel B - Column 1: number of exporters and number of FC exporters in the sample, all years. Column 2: 2000-
2001 averages of number of employees, age, Wooldridge (2009) modified Levinsohn-Petrin TFP, total assets, and
gross operating margins, all computed across exporting firms in the sample. Column 3: difference in means between
constrained vs. unconstrained exporters via log-OLS regressions of 2000-2001 averages of firms’ characteristics on
the FC dummy, controlling for 3-digit industry.
Robust standard error in parenthesis. ***: significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant
at the 10% level.
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that interact with external credit constraints in determining the financial status of a firm.7 These
are total assets to proxy for availability of collateral, and gross operating margins as a measure of
internally generated resources. Comparing all firms vs. exporting firms (Panel A vs. Panel B), we
confirm the stylised facts that exporters are on average bigger, older and more productive. Also, they
have a stronger financial side, with more assets and more internal resources.
Measuring financial constraints
Our assessment of firm-level financing constraints is based on a firm-specific credit rating issued
yearly by CB. This rating is the result of an in-depth analysis conducted by professional analysts,
complementing hard data on borrowers with relevant soft information collected locally.8 The con-
struction of the credit rating follows two steps. A first step consists in the development of a score
based on a broad set of qualitative and quantitative variables.9 Second, a group of analysts combines
this score with additional information collected locally through direct contacts with the company
and with other relevant institutional and market operators. The resulting index is given on a scale
of 9 categories of creditworthiness: 1-high reliability, 2-reliability, 3-ample solvency, 4-solvency,
5-vulnerability, 6-high vulnerability, 7-risk, 8-high risk, and 9-extremely high risk.
The traditional difficulty in measuring financial constraints originates in the usual inability to
observe when the credit supply schedule faced by a firm becomes inelastic, so that the option to resort
to external financial resources is ruled out. To overcome this measurement problem, the literature
proposes a few indirect proxies of FC based either on what firms say and perceive, or on data coming
from their balance sheets and financial statements. As Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist (2013) explain,
the common identification assumption underlying all these approaches is “that managers’ words or
actions reflect the shape of the credit supply curve as they perceive it.” Credit ratings, in general, and
the CB rating in particular represent a valid alternative proxy for FCs since they capture the shape of
a firm’s credit supply curve as the credit market perceives it. Let us explain why we believe this is the
case.
First, the CB rating works as an official rating internal to the Italian credit system, widely used
and benchmarked by Italian banks in the evaluation of potential borrowers. The tight link with the
banking system is crucial. In fact, although the Italian banking system is comparatively small with
respect to the real economy (2.7 times the GDP compared to, for instance, 4.2 times the GDP in
France), bank credit plays a prominent role as a source of financing of firms in Italy. Almost 70% of
the financial debts of non-financial corporations is made up by bank loans, while the same share is
7In applying the Wooldridge (2009) TFP estimator, we take value added as a proxy for output, employees and gross
tangible assets to proxy for labour and capital inputs, respectively, and cost of material inputs as a proxy for intermediate
inputs. Here and in the following, variables are deflated with appropriate sectoral price indexes collected by ISTAT.
Complete deflator series are available only at the 2-digit level. We therefore perform deflation at this level of aggregation.
The base year is 2000.
8Soft information refers to any kind of data other than the relative transparent public information about the firm such as
the availability of collateral or other balance sheet data. See Petersen (2004) for a discussion on soft vs. hard information.
Detailed information is available at http://www.cervedgroup.com .
9These include i) financial statement figures combined with geographical and sector-specific risk components; ii)
qualitative indicators concerning a company’s market share positioning, quality of governance and prospects for the
future; iii) behavioral evaluation based on punctuality in payments to suppliers, default of payments or other credit events.
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only 37% in France and 55% in Germany (see Figure A1 in the Appendix). By contrast, Italian capital
and bond markets are quite small compared to other major countries. The stock market capitalization
of Italian non financial corporations is less that 20% of GDP, compared with 75% in France and
45% in Germany (Figure A2 in the Appendix). Bond financing of Italian non financial corporations
amounts to less than 8% of firms’ total financial debt (Figure A3 in the Appendix).10
Second, the CB index works well as a proxy for what banks do. Previous empirical analyses
indeed show that there is a tight link between the CB rating and the availability and the cost of
external finance. Guiso et al. (2013) provide clear evidence that, ceteris paribus, bad ratings have a
clear association with higher interest rates and thus, with the cost of credit. Panetta et al. (2009) show
that it is unlikely that a firm with poor rating can receive any credit.11
Third, the CB index does not merely work as a summary measure of firm performance. Indeed,
previous empirical analyses (Bottazzi et al., 2008, 2013) corroborate the complex and rich informa-
tional content of the index, showing that an important fraction of highly productive, highly profitable
and fast growing firms receive very poor scores.
In the attempt to exploit the CB rating to identify firms likely to face an inelastic credit supply
curve, we build a financial constraints dummy (FC) that looks at the worst rating situation over the
relevant time span. Specifically, given the time-series average structure of the data and since we will
be using lagged FC status in the empirical models, we take the maximum (i.e. the worst) rating
assigned to each firm between 2000 and 2001, and build a dummy that equals 1 if the max rating is 8
or 9, and 0 otherwise.12 This choice is in line with the recent evidence by Farre-Mensa and Ljungqvist
(2013) showing that only the very poorly rated firms do experience a vertical credit supply curve.13
According to our definition, the percentage of firms defined as FC firms is 17.5% of the whole
sample. The same ratio is 12.8% for exporters, and 21.3% for non-exporters.14 Figure A4 in Ap-
pendix shows the geographical distribution of FC firms across Italian provinces. Notwithstanding the
relatively lower presence of FC firms in Northern provinces, rationed firms are not clustered in few
10Further indirect support to the importance of the banking system for external financial resources in Italy comes from
the SAFE survey run by the ECB. In the May 2009 wave only about 25% of Italian SMEs declared that they did not apply
for a bank loan (new or renewal) because of sufficient internal funds.
11More generally, in the empirical literature about the micro-economic assessment of financial constraints the supply
of bank loans is modeled as a function of different parameters including, when available, a firm’s credit rating. Kremp
and Sevestre (2012), for instance, include in the supply equation for new loans not only financial indicators but also the
firm rating developed by the Bank of France that is made available to private banks for their lending activity.
12Similar results, available upon request, are obtained if we take the average of the rating over the two years. Note also
that, as an ordinal variable, it would be questionable to directly use the 1-9 rating scores among the regressor, as indeed
there is no quantitative meaning in moving, for instance, from class 3 to class 5. The binary categorization, moreover,
avoids the potential error in variables problem arising from including dummies for each of the 9 original rating classes.
An alternative approach would be to exploit the graduation of scores and build more than two classes. Guiso et al. (2013)
insert in their wage regression an intermediate class of Mildly Financially Constrained (MFC) firms defined as rated 4-
6, while Bottazzi et al. (2008) and Bottazzi et al. (2013) include a mid-constrained category of rated 5-7 firms in their
analysis of productivity, profitability and growth dynamics of Italian firms. In all of these studies, however, it is only for
the class of worst rated firms that one observes statistically significant differences with the rest of the sample.
13They indeed find that like our “very poor CB rating” measure, only a dummy capturing if a firm is a “junk bond
issuer” works as a proper FC identifier.
14These numbers are in line with previous studies on Italy. According to Guiso et al. (2013), firms with a bad rating
are 19% of the entire population. Similar shares are observed by Minetti and Zhu (2011) who use a survey’s question as
a proxy of financial rationing: 18% of exporters and 21.6% of non-exporters are rationed according to their measure.
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Figure 1: EMPIRICAL DENSITY OF (log) UNIT VALUES.
Notes: Kernel estimate of the empirical density of the (log) unit values of export transactions performed by
constrained (red line) and unconstrained (blue line) exporters, averaged over 2002-2003 and controlling for
product-country fixed effects. The kernel function is Epanenchnikov and the bandwidth is set according the
standard heuristics in Silverman (1986). A conservative confidence band (confidence level higher than 99%) is
also reported. Stochastic dominance of the density of constrained firms is tested via the Fligner and Policello
(1981) test. The value of the test statistics is 26.27 with an associated p-value lower than 10−6.
local areas.15
Column 3 of Table 1 presents basic correlation between the measure of financial constraints and
key firm characteristics. We report differences in mean between constrained and unconstrained firms
by running an OLS regression of firm attributes (in logs and averaged over 2000-2001) on the FC
dummy, including 3-digit industry fixed effects to get rid of sector-specific patterns on the production
side.16 Looking at the entire sample (in Panel A) we confirm common findings about constrained
firms: FC firms tend to be smaller, younger, less productive, and suffer, on average, from a rela-
tive weaker financial structure in terms of less assets and less internally generated resources. Once
conditioning on being exporters (in Panel B), the results do not change.
Figure 1 provides a first look at our main research question, that is the relationship between FCs
and transaction-level prices. We report kernel estimates of the empirical distributions of the (log)
unit values of export transactions, averaging over 2002-2003 for the same firm-product-destination
triplet, and breaking down the observations by constrained (red line) vs. unconstrained firms (blue
line). To avoid mixing together unit values of, e.g., ’pasta’ (with a median 0.62 e/Kg) and ’pre-
cious metals’ (with a median 17,200e/Kg), we plot the distribution in deviation from average values
15That is, some Southern provinces also present a relatively low share of rationed firms and some Northern provinces
have relatively high presence of constrained firms. This is also in line with results in Minetti and Zhu (2011).
16Note that the same product can be exported by firms belonging to different industrial sectors, given the imperfect
overlap between the classification of traded products (HS6) and the classification of industrial production (NACE).
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Table 2: FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND (log) UNIT VALUE: OLS-FE ESTIMATES
(1) (2)
No Controls Baseline
Financially constrained firms dummy (FC) 0.083∗∗∗ (0.004) 0.134∗∗∗ (0.004)
log TFP 0.268∗∗∗ (0.002)
log number of employees 0.181∗∗∗ (0.002)
log age 0.024∗∗∗ (0.001)
log total assets -0.132∗∗∗ (0.002)
log gross operating margin -0.045∗∗∗ (0.001)
North dummy 0.103∗∗∗ (0.005)
Center dummy 0.106∗∗∗ (0.005)
Number of observations 1,825,473 1,825,473
Product-Country FE Yes Yes
3 dgt sectoral dummies Yes Yes
Notes: The dependent variable is the (log) export unit value at the product-country level.
Columns 1 and 2: regressions estimated on the whole sample of exporters. All the regres-
sions include a constant, 3-digit industry dummies and HS6 product-country pair fixed effects
(226,812 categories in columns 1-2).
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at product-country level. ***: significant at the
1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.
computed across different firms exporting within the same HS6 product-and-country market (mim-
icking product-country fixed effects). We compare the two distributions using a non parametric test
of stochastic dominance (Fligner and Policello, 1981). The null hypothesis is that the probability
that a transaction by a FC firm displays a higher (log) unit value than a transaction by a non-FC firm
is higher than 1/2. In case of rejection of the null, the sign of the test statistic tells which group is
dominating. In Figure 1 the null is rejected and the positive value of the test statistic (26.27) means
that FC firms are more likely to display higher unit values as compared to NFC firms.
3 Empirical analysis
This Section moves to regression analysis. We introduce the baseline empirical model and the identi-
fication strategy, and then present the main findings.
Empirical model
The relationship between export prices of Italian manufacturing firms and their FC status is studied
through the following baseline regression
ln EUVfpc,t = γFCf,t−1 + X′f,t−1β + µpc + fpc,t , (1)
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where EUVfpc is the (f.o.b) unit value of product p exported to country c by firm f at time t, and the
regressor of primary interest is the dummy FCf,t−1, which equals 1 if firm f is financially constrained
at time t − 1 and 0 otherwise.17 X is a set of firm-level controls, all measured at t − 1. It includes
all the variables already presented in the descriptive analysis above. We use the lagged value of firm
characteristics to ensure that the estimated coefficients are not contaminated by possible feedback
effects of export prices on productivity and other firm attributes. The controls in X also include a full
set of 3-digit industry (NACE codes) dummies, as well as geographical dummies accounting for well
known differences in the level of development and other characteristics across Italian macro-areas
(North, Center, and South plus Islands). The error term includes HS6 product-destination country
fixed effects, µpc, and a standard random component fpc,t. Product-destination fixed effects control
for all factors common across firms active within the same product-destination pair, including fixed
export costs specific to the product variety and the partner country. They therefore also account for
product-specific characteristics that are invariant across manufacturers and trade partners, as well as
destination-specific economic determinants of prices that affect all products and firms selling there,
such as consumer income, bilateral distance, transportation costs, market toughness.
OLS estimates of Equation 1 capture basic correlations. Given product-destination fixed effects,
the coefficient of interest (γ) is identified purely from the variation of export prices and FC status
across firms within the same product-destination market. Results are reported in Table 2, with stan-
dard errors clustered at product-country level, but the results are robust to alternative clustering by
firm, product, or destination. In column 1, we suppress firm level controls. The estimates confirm the
positive correlation of financial constraints with unit values suggested by the distributional analysis
presented above. The estimated coefficient tells that the price charged on transactions by constrained
firms is on average 8.7% (0.083 log points) higher than the price set in transactions by unconstrained
firms exporting the same HS6 product to the same destination market.
In column 2, we introduce firm specific controls. The estimate of γ remains positive and the price
premium for FC firms increases to 14.3% (0.134 log points). This implies that failing to control for
other firm attributes associates with a downward bias in the FC coefficient. For instance, since it is
known (Bastos and Silva, 2010; Berman et al., 2012) that less productive or smaller firms tend to
fix lower prices and are also more likely to be constrained, excluding productivity or size from the
regression understates the impact of FCs on export prices. With respect to the specification without
controls the observed effect is 61% higher: more than half of the price premium is associated with
differences in productivity, size, age, total assets and internal resources between constrained and
unconstrained firms.
The estimated coefficient on (log) TFP suggests that a 100 percent increase in productivity is
associated with a 30.7% (0.268 log points) increase in export prices. The result corroborates previous
findings and it is consistent with the endogenous quality theories of trade: more productive firms
choose more expensive inputs to produce higher quality goods for which they charge higher prices
(Bastos and Silva, 2010; Ge et al., 2013). The coefficient on (log) employees suggests that the price
elasticity to firm size is also positive and significant: everything else equal, bigger firms charge higher
17Recall that t and t − 1 in represent time averages over 2002-2003 and 2000-2001, respectively, while the FCf,t−1
dummy is defined based on the worst rating assigned to the firm between 2000 and 2001.
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prices for a product exported in a certain destination (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012). The magnitude of
the association is somewhat smaller than the one observed for productivity: a 100 percent increase in
firm size translates into a 19.8% increase in the export price. The estimated coefficient on age suggests
that firms with more experience charge higher export prices. The two financial-side controls both turn
out statistically significant and with a negative sign: the greater the availability of collateral or internal
resources (and thus the lower the likelihood to be constrained), the lower the price charged for export
transactions. The associated percentage reduction in unit values is 14.0% and 4.6%, respectively.
Finally, we observe that firms located in the Center and North of Italy tend to set higher unit values.
This is expected, however: given the geographical disparities in Italy, Center-North located firms are
typically more innovate and produce higher quality products.18
Identification strategy
There is a concern that our measure of financial constraints could be endogenous, inducing a bias in
OLS-FE estimates of the effect of financial constraints on pricing behavior. First, OLS-FE can be
biased due to standard omitted variables or measurement error issues, that is if firms characteristics
that we do not observe or that we only imperfectly measure generate a variation in export prices and
at the same time are correlated with our FC proxy. For instance, it can be that our size or produc-
tivity proxies are mis-measured. Since banks are usually more likely to provide credit to larger and
more productive firms, which in turn are known to set higher export prices, then we expect the OLS
estimates of γ to be downward biased. Second, we need to tackle endogeneity due to reverse causal-
ity, arising from potential joint determination of the FC status and export prices. Indeed, although
information on export prices does not directly enter the construction of the CB rating index, we could
expect that overall export strategies of firms might matter for firm ability to access external credit,
thus creating a correlation between FC status and export prices.
Although the relatively rich set of controls and detailed product-destination fixed-effects already
contribute to absorb a good deal of endogeneity, we adopt an instrumental variable approach. In what
follows we define our instrument, explain why we believe it is exogenous and the rationale behind its
use, and provide evidence of its correlation with the FC dummy.
In the absence of firm-level alternatives, we consider a provincial level instrument reflecting an
exogenous shock to credit supply caused by the progressive removal, during the 1990s, of a se-
ries of legal restrictions to provincial-level banking services. As explained in detail in Guiso et al.
(2004, 2006), until the 1990s the geographical distribution of banks and bank branches across Ital-
ian provinces came about as application of the norms enacted by the regulatory authority in 1936.
They were dictating limits to the number of banks and affiliates by province, in a way essentially
unrelated to the structural characteristics and the level of development of the provinces themselves.
18In an unreported regression we suppress averaging over time and exploit the four years panel to estimate the baseline
model with firm, product and country fixed effects. The coefficient γ in this case is identified purely from the variation
of the FC status within a firm across time, controlling for any product and any country characteristic (e.g., an aggregate
change in relative demand) that is common across firms. The coefficient, although smaller (0.010 log points), is positive
and statistically significant, supporting that the positive relationship between financial constraints and prices holds even
when removing unobserved time-invariant individual heterogeneity. We cannot control for endogeneity in such panel
regressions, however, since our instruments do not vary over time (see below).
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The 1990-1999 difference in the number of bank branches per 1,000 inhabitants
Figure 2: GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION OF THE 1990-1999 DIFFERENCE IN THE NUMBER OF
BANK BRANCHES (LEFT PANEL) AND ITS RELATION WITH SHARE OF FC FIRMS IN OUR DATA,
BY PROVINCE (RIGHT PANEL).
Notes: Plots and fit are based on 103 provincial observations. In the left panel, the darker the province map and
the higher the 1990-99 difference in the number of bank branches in that province. In the right panel, the linear
fit is a Least Absolute Deviation regression: estimated parameters are 0.121∗∗∗(0.007) and -0.088∗∗(0.033) for
the intercept and the slope, respectively. Robust standard errors, ***: significant at the 1% level.
The subsequent removal of the regulation during the 1990s freed up banks’ possibility to open new
local affiliates. This exogenous change had differentiated impact across provinces, also in relation to
the fact that different types of banks (cooperative or saving banks), unevenly spread across provinces
at the time of deregulation, where differently affected by the removal of limitations to open new
branches.
Exploiting such historical events, we instrument the FC dummy with the 1990-1999 difference in
the number of bank branches (per 1,000 inhabitants) in each province. Similar instruments, based on
exogenous change in the geographical distribution of bank branches, originally developed in Guiso
et al. (2004), have been recently applied by Minetti and Zhu (2011) to instrument a firm-level proxy
of financial constraints. While they study how FCs affect firm-level export margins of a sample of
Italian firms, we here extend the investigation to transaction-level export prices.19
Key for identification is to clarify the link between the instrument and the CB rating. The main
channel through which the instrument could affect credit conditions is via the soft information that
is reflected in the credit rating. In general, we expect an increase in local branch density and a
lower distance between banks and customer firms to allow banks to gather more precise information,
19Other empirical analyses on Italy use the geographical distribution of branches in 1936 to instrument provincial level
banking variables measuring the local level of financial development. See Herrera and Minetti (2007); Alessandrini et al.
(2010); Benfratello et al. (2008).
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resulting into more favorable credit ratings.20 This stands on two assumptions.
First, an important part of banks’ knowledge of potential borrowing firms is not easily codified and
therefore it is not easily transmitted far away from where firms are located. Without this information
firms look more opaque, and the typical reaction by the banking system is a more conservative and
distrustfully approach to evaluation of potential borrowers, an attitude that in turn translates into
attaching worse ratings to firms. Second, and relatedly, physical proximity between banks and firms
reduces opacity and increases the overall level of trust, for instance through repeated interactions.
Eventually, a wider diffusion of local level banking services makes the banks more prone to accept
potential borrowers’ requests. This should translates into better credit rating scores by banks and by
other credit institutions within the banking system.
Supporting this view is the large body of research that recognizes the importance for lending deci-
sions of proximity between banks and borrowers. Petersen and Rajan (1995) show that higher branch
density affects firms’ credit supply due to the ability of banks to overcome asymmetric information by
locally collecting soft information on firms. Bonaccorsi di Patti and Gobbi (2001); Carling and Lund-
berg (2005) provide evidence that the distance between a firm and a bank branch positively affects the
availability of credit. In the Italian case, Alessandrini et al. (2009) show that functional distance and,
to some extent, operational proximity between local banking system and local borrowers influence
firms’ probability of being rationed over the time period 1996-2003.21
Therefore, we expect the instrument to capture the variation in the ability of banks to collecting
more and more precise information on firms, in turn positively affecting credit ratings and thus reduc-
ing financial constraints. By contrast the same variation is not expected to directly impact neither on
firm export behavior nor on unobserved firm characteristics that determine export behavior.
Figure 2 provides empirical support to the validity of the instrument. In the left panel we look
at the intensity of the 1990-1999 difference in the number of bank branches (per 1,000 inhabitants)
by province. The provinces with the greater number of newly created bank branches are those in the
Center-North of Italy. Still, the instrument shows a great deal of variability, even within sub-areas.22
The right panel of Figure 2 shows that the 1990-1999 difference in the number of branches in each
province is highly correlated, with expected negative sign, with the share of financially constrained
firms in that province. OLS and Least Absolute Deviation estimates of the slope of the relationship
gives a coefficient of −0.095 (the standard error is 0.039) and −0.088 (the standard error is 0.034)
respectively.
Once we allow for endogeneity of the FC dummy, Equation (1) becomes a standard dummy
endogenous variable model. Following Wooldridge (2010), we estimate the model via a two-step
procedure: (i) we estimate by maximum likelihood the binary response model P (FCf = 1|X,Z)
20As explained in detail in Section 2, the credit rating is not simply an automatic formula based on quantitative and
qualitative data. Rather, it also depends on soft information obtained by the analyst through direct contacts with firms and
their the local market.
21Transportation costs and the level of competition in the local credit market are other theoretical explanations put
forward in the literature to explain why distance may affect the credit supply. See for example Boot and Thakor (2000).
22As shown in Figure A4 in the Appendix, the provinces with an higher increase in the number of branches also
correspond to provinces where the vast majority of firm is located. In particular: 70% of firms in the sample are located
in the North, 18% in the Center and 12% in the South. Robustness checks presented in the following show that our main
result is not driven by a simple spatial effect.
14 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.57R (Version révisée)
Table 3: FIRST STEP PROBIT ESTIMATES
Panel A - Coefficients
1990-1999 Difference in # of bank branches -0.625∗∗∗ (0.188)
log TFP -0.126∗∗∗ (0.023)
log number of employees -0.089∗∗∗ (0.016)
log age -0.313∗∗∗ (0.016)
log total assets 0.228∗∗∗ (0.015)
log gross operating margin -0.302∗∗∗ (0.008)
North dummy 0.260∗∗∗ (0.047)
Center dummy 0.194∗∗∗ (0.053)
Panel B - Goodness of fit
Number of observations 39,846
Adjusted R2 0.208
Brier score 0.072
AUC score 0.828
Notes: Panel A - Probit estimates, the dependent variable is Pr(FC=1).
Regression includes a constant and 3-digit industry dummies. Estimates
on the whole sample of exporters.
Panel B - Goodness of fit statistics. The Brier score is computed as
BS = (1/N)
∑
(FˆC − FC), where FˆC is status predicted by the model
and FC the actual status: the closer to zero the better the fit. The AUC
score measures the area under the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteris-
tics) curve: the closer to 1 the better the predictive power.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at provincial level. ***:
significant at the 1% level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at
the 10% level.
where X is the above set of firm level controls and Z the instrument, and obtain the associated fitted
probabilities Pˆ ; next, (ii) we estimate equation (1) by 2SLS-IV using the fitted probabilities Pˆ as
instrument. There are several nice features of this IV estimator: it is robust to mis-specification of the
probit model, it is more efficient than directly including the number of branches opened in 1990-99
as an instrument into an IV procedure and, finally, it does not require to adjust the 2SLS-IV standard
errors.23
2SLS-IV estimates
In the first step we build Pˆ via maximum likelihood estimation of the following probit
P(FCf=1 | X,Z) = Φ
(
δ1Z + X′fβ + f
)
, (2)
23Standard weak instrument diagnostics are known to fail in this context (Nichols, 2007). See the Appendix for a
number of further validation of the good properties of the instrument Pˆ .
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where the probability to be in the FC group is regressed on the instrument Z, i.e. the 1990-1999
difference in the number of branches in the province wherein a firm is located, and on the set X of
controls employed in the baseline OLS-FE regression above.24
Table 3 reports the results. The coefficient on the instrument, δ1, is significant and negative: the
more branches opened in a province, the lower the probability for a firm in that province to face
tighter financial constraints. Coefficient estimates on the controls tell that more productive, larger,
older firms generating higher internal resources are less exposed to credit problems. This is in line
with economic intuition. Panel B of Table 3 reports different goodness of fit statistics for the probit
model: they do not suggest any specific pathology.25
Next, in the second step, we estimate equation (1) via 2SLS-IV taking Pˆ as the instrument for the
FC dummy. Results are presented in Table 4, with the errors clustered at product-country level.26 In
column 1 we consider the baseline model over the whole sample of exporters. The instrument works
well: it has explanatory power, and we observe here (Panel B) that it is statistically significant in the
first stage. In the main regression (Panel A), the estimated coefficient on the FC dummy is 0.580. This
implies that financially constrained firms fix on average 78% larger unit values than non-FC firms for
the same product exported to the same destination country. The elasticities of size and productivity are
positive and strongly significant. The coefficient on age is also positive and statistically significant,
although the effect is smaller in magnitude. Conversely, availability of collateral and availability of
internal resources associate with lower prices. Finally, firms located in the Center-North of Italy tend
to show higher unit values.
It is instructive to compare the 2SLS-IV results with the above OLS estimates with product-
country fixed effects (column 2 of Table 2). Without instrumenting, the coefficient on the FC dummy
is positive and significant, but smaller than the 2SLS-IV coefficient (0.134 vs. 0.580). There are
several explanations for this downward bias of OLS-FE results, all related to possible correlation be-
tween the regressors and the endogenous component of the FC proxy. First, OLS-FE estimates might
be attenuated if firms with a less stringent financial constraint are also those with higher market power
and higher markup. Second, firms that are financially constrained might tend to be less productive
on average, and at the same time to produce lower quality goods for which they can charge lower
prices. If our control for productivity is not perfect, this might contribute to the downward bias of the
OLS-FE.
The positive relationship between financial constraints and export prices is confirmed by a series
of robustness checks. These are reported in columns 2-5 of Table 4.27 First, we exclude firms with
one employee (column 2). These firms represent self-employment, headquarters, or ultimate parent
companies in groups. Their export dynamics are thus very specific. The estimated FC coefficient
is not statistically different with respect to the baseline results in column 1 within a 1-standard error
24As before, variables are measured as averages over two consecutive years, and controls are lagged accordingly.
25Additional exercises supporting the probit goodness of fit are presented in the Appendix.
26Since the instrument is at the province level, in an unreported regression we also cluster standard errors at both
product-country and province level. Results, available upon request, do not differ from those reported in the Table.
27For each robustness check, the Probit model used to build Pˆ is correspondingly adapted. Results for these Probit
estimates (available upon request) are consistent with those reported in Table 3 above. Further, Table A3 in the Appendix
documents the results obtained separately on each year, i.e. without averaging over time. The estimated FC coefficient is
positive in all years.
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confidence band. Second, we drop marginal products and destinations, defined here as those involving
less than 1% of the overall exports of each firm (column 3). Removing such transactions might make
the identification cleaner, as indeed studies on multi-products firms find that products closer to the
core firm competencies sell for higher prices than non-core products (Manova and Zhang, 2012b;
Eckel et al., 2011). The positive price premium for FC firms is preserved, but the point estimate on
the FC dummy coefficient is now statistically larger (0.897) than in full-sample baseline regression.
This suggests that constrained firms tend to act even more strongly on the unit values of core products
and destinations. Third, in order to account for the potentially particular behavior of multinational
companies, which are usually found to set higher prices than domestic firms (cfr. Ge et al., 2013), we
drop MNCs from our regression (column 4). Our baseline findings are not affected: the estimated γ is
higher, but within a 1 standard error confidence band as compared to the full sample results. Finally, in
order to eliminate possible confounding factors related to exchange rate dynamics, we re-estimate the
model considering only the export transactions to partner countries that use the EURO currency over
the entire sample period (column 5).28 The point estimate of the FC coefficient (0.631) is larger than
in column 1, but it is statistically equal to the baseline estimate within a 1 standard error confidence
band.
2SLS-IV validation
We perform further validation exercises of the IV strategy. We control for possible violations of the
exclusion restriction, check results against different definitions of the FC status, and provide evidence
that results are not driven by a pure geographical effect arising from the observed geographical distri-
bution of our instrument. The results, presented in Table 5, are fairly robust across all these additional
exercises and support the main conclusion emerging from the core 2SLS-IV estimates of the previous
Section.
Failure of the exclusion restriction may arise from potential correlation between the instrument
and idiosyncratic province-level components of the error term that are at the same time related to
firms’ export pricing strategies. To account for this potential problem, we re-estimate our baseline
regression including additional provincial-level control variables capturing factors that may affect
firm export prices and correlate with the level of development of the banking sector. In column 1,
following Minetti and Zhu (2011), we add the (log of) GDP and population of each province (pro-
vided by the Italian Statistical Office), and an index of infrastructural development of Italian provinces
obtained from the research conducted by the Association of Italian Chambers of Commerce in col-
laboration with the “Guglielmo Tagliacarne” Institute. The results are unaffected by the inclusion of
these provincial controls: the FC dummy is still positive and statistically significant, and the point
estimate is statistically equal (within 1 standard error band) to the baseline estimates. Further, in
column 2, we control for the level of financial development of the province at the beginning of the
deregulation, by normalizing our instrument for the number of branches in 1990. Also in this case the
main result of a positive price premium for FC firms is preserved, and the magnitude is statistically
28These countries are Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portu-
gal, and Spain.
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comparable to the baseline regression.
Next, we test the robustness of results to alternative definitions of the FC group. First, in column
3, we include in the definition of the FC class also the firms with a CB rating of 7. We observe a
sharp reduction in the estimated FC dummy coefficient (0.170), as we expect given the less stringent
identification of firms facing inelastic supply of credit. Yet, the positive price premium for FC firms
is still there.29
Second, in column 4, we base identification of constrained firms on one of the indirect proxies
commonly used in the financial constraints literature, that is firm leverage (in terms of assets-to-equity
ratio). We create a FC dummy which equals 1 for firms with leverage higher than the median, and
zero otherwise. We still get consistent evidence of a strongly statistical significance of the FC price
premium.
Finally, there might be a concern about the possible influence of spatial distribution of the instru-
ment, notwithstanding the already pinpointed good deal of geographical variation. We re-estimate the
baseline model separately for firms located in the North of Italy. Results are reported in columns 5.
We find that there is some interplay with spatial factors, as indeed the FC coefficient for the North
sample is somewhat smaller than in the full sample results. Nonetheless, the impact of FCs on prices
remains positive and significant, once again confirming our main conclusions.
4 Discussion
The message from the regression analysis is that, controlling for firm characteristics, constrained firms
sell at higher prices than unconstrained firms exporting within the same product-destination market.
There are different theoretical mechanisms which can explain this finding. The class of industrial
organization models of competition in markets with demand rigidities or imperfect consumer adjust-
ment is a candidate. The key logic in these models is that setting high prices is a viable strategy, for
firms unable to access external finance, to increase revenues in the attempt to keep financing invest-
ment and to meet current liabilities. However, some degree of friction in the product market is needed
to allow firms to price above competitors without loosing too much demand. Typical examples of
such frictions are switching costs for buyers in moving from one seller to another, for instance in the
form of brand loyalty (see the survey in Klemperer, 1995). Same logic underlies models based on
the classic customer market model (Phelps and Winter, 1991) which directly postulate a time lag in
consumers’ reaction to price changes (Gottfries, 2002; Lundin et al., 2009), and applies to models as-
suming large costs for adjusting quantities (Gagnon, 1989), so that acting on prices is the only viable
strategy for constrained firms in the short run.30
29The results are also consistent if we exclude from regression sample the somewhat borderline group of rated-7 firms.
The estimated γ is 0.512 in this case, results available upon request.
30In principle, one can also envisage models where constrained firms choose aggressive pricing (i.e. sell at lower price
than unconstrained competitors), seeking to sustain profits by expanding market shares. Models of pricing under financial
distress (see for instance Dasgupta and Titman, 1998; Pichler et al., 2008) show that the incentive to raise vs. reduce
prices depends on the maturity structure of the debt: the higher the burden of short term repayment, and the higher the
probability that distressed firms set higher prices and renounce to market shares in the short run. However, the conjecture
that constrained firms can increase international sales and gain market shares seems clearly at odds with the stylised fact
in the literature that financial constraints generally associate with a reduction in the margins of export.
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To illustrate the key mechanism relating prices and capital market imperfections in these frame-
works, consider a simple duopoly where two firms compete over two periods producing the same
good with equal marginal costs (or productivity). Assume that there exists a certain degree of product
differentiation, and that consumers have to pay a cost if they are willing to switch seller from one
period to another.31 Switching costs create an incentive for firms to price below the standard marginal
cost pricing rule. Indeed, in period 1, firms find it optimal to cut prices and lock-in an higher number
of consumers, anticipating that they will be able to charge a monopoly price in the second period. To
see the impact of financing problems in this setting, assume that a firm cannot entirely cover oper-
ations or investment via internal resources. The same firm can, however, access to external finance
through a standard incentive compatible contract. Under the natural assumption that the true cash flow
is not observed by the creditor institution, but observed and maybe be diverted to perks or pet projects
by managers, the optimal contract foresees full-repayment at end of period 1, and imposes a threat
of full liquidation at end of period 1 if the repayment is not met.32 This creates a weaker incentive
to price below standard marginal costs as compared to the no-imperfections case: since there is now
a positive probability that the firm will not meet the contract, the gains from locked-in consumers
are now lower in expectations. Given strategic interaction, both constrained and unconstrained firms
set a price higher than the price without capital markets imperfections, but this upward distortion is
stronger for constrained firms.
Within the international trade literature, theoretical attempts to study financial constraint effects (Muuls,
2008; Manova et al., 2011; Chaney, 2013) provide variations of the Melitz (2003) monopolistic com-
petition model with heterogeneous firms. The model in Fan et al. (2012) is a valid benchmark for the
price-constraints links consistent with this literature. The model setting assumes consumers with a
standard quality-adjusted CES utility over different varieties of the same good, which entails that, in
addition to the standard price-quantity relation, higher quality and more advertised products generate
larger demand. On the production side, firms are heterogeneous in productivity and each produce a
specific variety of the good with a single input (i.e. labor) technology. Firms face an iceberg trade
cost and, following a common approach, the marginal cost of production is an increasing function of
quality: higher quality implies higher marginal costs, induced by the hiring of higher quality workers
or by investing in R&D. Moreover, each firm faces two different types of fixed costs: a production
fixed cost capturing the fixed investment in quality and a marketing fixed cost modeled as a function
of the advertisement intensity capturing all the costs of penetrating into foreign markets. The role of
financial constraints is modeled similarly to Manova (2013), so that firms need external capital to fi-
nance a fraction of all types of costs (fixed and variable). However, due to financial constraints, firms
can borrow only up to a fraction of their cash flow.33 Two mechanisms connect prices to financing
problems in this set up. First, controlling for productivity, constrained firms sell at higher prices than
unconstrained firms to sustain cash flow and ease the constraints. This mechanism is called “price
distortion” effect. Here advertisement plays a role similar to consumers’ switching costs or any other
31One can model product differentiation by means of a unit transportation cost, assuming as standard that this represents
an opportunity cost payed by consumers if a product in the market does not match her/his ideal variety.
32See Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996). Notice that liquidation is an inefficient outcome since firm assets are worth
less if managed by the investors.
33Predictions do not change if external finance is needed to only cover fixed costs.
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source of demand rigidity creating the scope for frictional response of consumers to higher prices.
However, there is also a second, “quality adjustment” effect which pushes prices of constrained firms
down. Again controlling for productivity, financially constrained firms sell lower quality goods at
lower prices since they cannot afford the higher cost of quality. Fan et al. (2012) show that when
product quality is endogenously determined the latter effect dominates on the former, leading finan-
cially constrained firms to charge lower prices than unconstrained ones. On the contrary, when quality
is exogenous constrained firms export at higher prices.
Based on these theoretical considerations, the positive export price premium for constrained firms
observed in the analysis is compatible with two alternative explanations. First, that prices set by FC
firms are higher because constrained firms revise upward their mark-up over unit costs. That is, there
exists only a price distortion effect. Or, second, constrained firms set higher prices because price
reduction induced by the choice of producing lower quality goods is crowded out by an increase in
the corresponding mark-up. That is, quality adjustment and a price distortion effects coexist, but the
latter dominates the former.
In addition to these two channels, and regardless the type of model considered, there might be a
third simple explanation based on costs. Indeed, it might be the case that constrained firms operate at
higher unit costs, irrespective of the quality level of their products, and thus they charge higher export
prices than unconstrained firms just to cover such higher cost of production.
Costs, Mark-up, Quality
We conclude the paper with a set of empirical investigations that seek to disentangle the relative
importance of the three theoretical explanations of the observed price-FCs relationship, at the same
time allowing for additional qualifications of our main findings.
Accounting for the costs effect requires to enrich our baseline regression model to include firm-
level proxies of unit costs among the regressors. Part of these costs, the cost of materials in particular,
is already captured into our TFP measure. Here we add three further variables, looking for additional
channels: the (log of) the unit wage, obtained as the ratio between the total labour expenses and the
number of employees, the (log of) the “interest rate” paid by firms, proxied trough the ratio between
yearly interest expenses and the stock of financial debt, and a proxy of the unit price of inputs which
exploits information on import transactions. Concerning this latter, since one cannot know which
particular imported input is used to produce a particular exported product, following Manova and
Zhang (2012a) we compute a firm-level index defined as the average of the unit values of a firm’s
import transactions in intermediate inputs (in logs), demeaned by their product specific averages
(computed across firms and destinations) and weighted by the share of each transaction in the overall
import revenues of a firm.34 Some points are worth noting to appreciate the merits of this measure.
First, although it does not reflect the costs of domestic inputs, the price of domestic and imported
inputs are typically highly correlated (Kugler and Verhoogen, 2012), and the costs of domestic inputs
34We identify transactions in intermediate inputs as those involving products that fall into the intermediate input cat-
egory according to CEPII-BACI classification system (see Gaulier and Zignago, 2010). The results do not change if we
instead use data on all imported products.
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already enter TFP estimates. Second, although the index can be computed only for importers, thus
restricting the sample to two-way traders, we have that in our dataset more than 70% of exporters are
also importers. Third, the index does not only capture unit costs of inputs, but it also allows for an at
least indirect control for the quality of inputs, as more costly imported inputs are typically associated
to exporters producing more costly and more sophisticated products (see evidence in Manova and
Zhang, 2012a).
Column 1 of Table 6 shows the results of 2SLS-IV estimates of the baseline specification aug-
mented with the cost regressors. Constrained firms are confirmed to charge higher prices. As com-
pared to baseline results (column 1 of Table 4), the export price premium of constrained firms is
smaller. The magnitude of the reduction (from 0.580 to 0.411) suggests that only a relatively small
fraction of the observed price premium of FC firms is driven by the cost mechanism.35 As expected,
all cost variables are positively associated with export prices. The estimate implies that a 100 percent-
age increase in the average wage translates into an export price rise of about 8.2% (0.079 log points).36
The effect of interest rate on export prices has a similar magnitude (coefficient 0.051). Instead, a 100
percent rise in the imported inputs price index is associated with a more sizable increase (0.31 log
points, or 36.3%) in export price, suggesting a strong positive correlation between export prices and
the price (or the quality) of intermediate inputs.37 The results on the other controls are in line with the
baseline regression.
Next, we try to improve our understanding of the relative importance of the mark-up or price-
distortion effect vs. the quality adjustment mechanism, by comparing patterns of estimates across
horizontally and vertically differentiated products. The rationale behind the exercises is the following.
First, irrespective of the existence of quality adjustments, when the varieties of a good provided
to the market are highly horizontally differentiated, it is easier for the competing firms to act on
prices without drastically affecting their market shares. Accordingly, a stronger mark-up or price-
distortion effect, and thus an higher coefficient on the FC dummy, should be observed within export
transactions involving less substitute products. Second, the quality adjustment mechanism, leading
constrained firms to export lower quality at lower price, should be stronger in products with high
vertical differentiation, where there is greater scope to act on quality differences, than in products
where there is narrower or no scope at all for quality up/down-grading. Thus, if adjustments related
to quality choices do matter, then we expect a smaller coefficient on the FC dummy in products where
vertical differentiation is more important.
To measure the degree of horizontal differentiation of exported products we exploit the classifica-
tion constructed by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012) using Colombian firm-level data. It is based on dis-
similarity component of the full Gallop-Monahn index, which measures dissimilarity of input mixes
across firms within an industry.38 Industries characterised by an high degree of dissimilarity are those
35In order to make a proper comparison we also re-run the baseline regression on the reduced sample of two-way
traders. The magnitude of the FC coefficient (0.506) is very similar to the full sample estimate reported in column 1 of
Table 4.
36Note however, that part of the effect is absorbed by TFP. The coefficient on unit wages becomes larger (0.190) if we
re-estimate the model excluding TFP from the regressors.
37In a similar regression without financial constraints Ge et al. (2013) find that the export price is 0.33 log points higher
for firms with an imported inputs price index that is one standard deviation above the sample average.
38This is the distance between the expenditure share on each input i in total expenditure of a firm active in a certain
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producing products which are less substitute and thus more horizontally differentiated.39 To measure
vertical differentiation of the export product categories we again follow Kugler and Verhoogen (2012)
and employ their classification based on the ratio of advertising plus R&D expenditures to total sales
in U.S. industries.40 The logic here is that firms invest more in R&D and advertising in sectors where
it is possible to affect quality and thus there is more scope for quality differentiation.41
We re-estimate equation (1) with 2SLS-IV, separately on different sub-samples of export trans-
actions involving products with different degrees of horizontal or vertical differentiation. Columns 2
and 3 of Table 6 explore the impact of horizontal differentiation. The two groups of High and Low
differentiated products are distinguished as the HS6 categories with dissimilarity index above and
below the median computed across all HS6 product categories. The coefficient estimates for the FC
dummy is not significant in the Low differentiated sub-sample, while it is positive and significant in
the High differentiated sample. The point estimate is 0.995, more than twice as larger as in the un-
splitted estimates in column 1. This magnitude suggests that horizontal differentiation, and the related
scope for price-distortion or mark-up effects related to locking-in customers, are indeed strong drivers
of pricing strategies.
In columns 4 and 5 of Table 6 we compare 2SLS-IV results across products with High or Low
vertical differentiation, respectively defined as HS6 product categories where the vertical differen-
tiation index is above or below the median value computed across all categories. The FC dummy
coefficient is positive and quite large (0.926) in the sub-sample of relatively less differentiated prod-
ucts. Conversely, it is still positive, but significantly smaller (0.136) than in the full sample estimate
if we take the sub-sample of relatively more vertically differentiated products. This evidence is in
agreement with the existence of a quality-adjustment mechanism. Indeed it tells that, when there is
more room for quality adjustment, the positive mark-up or price-distortion effect is counteracted by a
reduction of the price compatible with constrained firms choosing to export lower quality products at
lower prices. Finally, notice that we still include the proxies of unit costs, so that the conclusion on
coexistence of the price-distortion vs. quality channels hold for given costs effect.
5 Conclusion
The present paper provides a comprehensive analysis of the role that financial constraints play in
shaping firms’ export prices. We use detailed firm-product-country data on the international activities
industry and the average expenditure share on input i by all firms in the same industry. The sum of these distances
weighted by the revenue share of the firm in total industry revenues yields the industry-level measure.
39We convert the original ISIC (Rev.2) 4digit level classification of industrial sectors into HS6 product categories
through the concordance tables from http://www.macalester.edu/research/economics/page/haveman/Trade.Resources
/tradeconcordances.html .
40The original data are from the U.S. Federal Trade Commission 1975 Line of Business Survey. Kugler and Ver-
hoogen (2012) convert FTC 4-digit industry classification into ISIC (Rev. 2) 4-digit classification using verbal industry
descriptions. We convert from ISIC 4 digit level to HS6 product level using the appropriate concordance tables.
41As an additional robustness check, we also employ the Rauch (1999) measure, based on whether a good is traded on a
commodity exchange or it has quoted price in industry trade publications. This measures overall differentiation (i.e. both
horizontal and vertical). In fact, as argued by Kugler and Verhoogen (2012), although the trade literature has extensively
used the Rauch index as a measure of horizontal differentiation, it is indeed unclear which dimension it proxies for.
Results are available upon request.
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of a sample of firms covering the vast majority of Italian exporters. The work relates export prices
directly to firm-level financial constraint status, by exploiting a firm-level information on a credit
rating index internal to the Italian banking system. Moreover, it overcomes an important limitation of
previous studies looking at export prices, by adopting an instrumental variable strategy which allows
a proper identification of the effect of credit constraints. Thus, the article is the first to establish a
causal link from the financial status of exporters to their pricing strategies.
The key finding is that firms facing tighter credit conditions charge higher export prices, even
after controlling for key firm attributes and product-destination fixed effects. This price premium for
constrained firms is robust to a series of sensitivity analyses. It holds true if we remove firms with
only one employee, drop products and destination countries representing negligible shares of a firm’s
exports, exclude multinational firms, or exclude those transactions operated with a currency different
from the Euro. Also, the main message remains unchanged if we experiment with different definitions
of the group of constrained firms, or play with the degree of local variation of the data which is key
for identification given the provincial-level variability that we exploit in building our instruments.
Finally, the main result still comes up if we try to assess its relationship with mark-up strategies and
quality, by adding measures of unit costs and by looking at horizontal vs. vertical differentiation.
Our study contributes to the literature documenting the systematic variation in export prices across
firms, products and trade partners. The results point out that financial constraints, in addition to
efficiency or quality, should be taken into account to explain export price differences across firms. Our
main finding points at the co-existence of two mechanisms influencing export prices under financial
constraints. A price distortion or mark-up effect that tends to push the price charged by constrained
firms up, and an opposing quality adjustment mechanism that induces constrained firms set lower
prices. However, we observe that the former effect dominates the latter. This result posits a challenge
for the theory. Existing models predict a positive price premium only when quality is exogenous, an
assumption that it is hardly met in reality and already disproved by empirical studies.
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Appendix
The structure of the Italian financial system
The structure of the Italian financial system presents some peculiarities with respect to other major
countries. Figures A1-A3 in this Appendix show that in Italian firms’ external financing mainly occurs
through banks, partly due to the underdevelopment of bond and stocks markets.
Figure A1. Source: Panetta (2013). Based on data taken from Bank of Italy for Italy; Eurostat and ECB for the euro-area countries; Bank of England
for the United Kingdom; Federal Reserve System for the United States. (1) Bank debt comprises only the loans disbursed by the banks resident in each
country; (2) 2011 data.
Figure A2. Source: Panetta (2013). Based on Datastream data.
Custom data
In compliance with the common framework defined by the European Union (EU), there are differ-
ent requirements in order for a cross-border transaction to be recorded, depending on whether the
importing partner is an EU or NON-EU country, and on the value of the transaction.
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Figure A3. Source: Panetta (2013). Based on data taken from Bank of Italy for Italy; Eurostat and ECB for the euro-area countries; Bank of England
for the United Kingdom; Federal Reserve System for the United States.
As far as outside EU transactions are concerned, there is a good deal of homogeneity among
member states as well as over time. In the Italian system the information is derived from the Single
Administrative Document (SAD) which is compiled by operators for each individual transaction.
From the introduction of the Euro, Italy has set a threshold at 620 euro (or 1000 Kg) for a transaction
to be recorded. For all of these recorded extra-EU transactions, the COE data report complete about
product category, destination, quantity and value.
Transactions within the EU are collected according to a different system (Intrastat). There the
thresholds on the value of transactions qualifying for complete record are less homogeneous across
EU member states, with direct consequences on the type of information reported in the data. In 2003
(the last year covered in the analysis), there are two cut-offs. If a firm has more than 200,000 euro of
exports (based on previous year report), then she must fill the Intrastat document monthly. This im-
plies that complete information about product types is also available. Instead, if previous year export
value falls in between 40,000 and 200,000 euro, the quarterly Intrastat file has to be filled, imply-
ing that only the amount of export is recorded, while information on the product is not. Firms with
previous year exports below 40,000 euro are not required to report any information on trade flows.
According to ISTAT, although only one-third of the operators submitted monthly declarations, these
firms cover about 98% of trade flows (http://www.coeweb.istat.it/default.htm). Thus, firms which do
not appear in COE are either marginal exporters or do not export at all.
Representativeness
Table A1 shows that the representativeness of the dataset is quite satisfactory. We report here 2003
data, but figures are comparable in the other years. As mentioned in the main text, although the
dataset includes only about 20% of manufacturing in terms of number of firms, we cover about 60%
of manufacturing firms that do export, and about 84% of the total value of manufacturing exports. We
add here that these number are also basically stable across different industrial sectors.
This picture is explained by the well known abundance of micro and small firms in Italian manu-
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facturing, together with the observation that the legal status of limited firm tends to be more common
across medium-bigger firms, and medium-big firms are expected to account for the great bulk of over-
all export activities in the country, in line with a well established result in the literature. In agreement
with this, Table A2 shows that (again for 2003 but valid across other sample years) the firms in our
sample are on average slightly bigger and more productive (in terms of labour productivity here) than
the population of manufacturing firms. At the same time, however, we do not observe big differences
when we focus on exporting firms: the average size, labour productivity, export values, number of
exported products and number of destinations served do not differ significantly between our sample
and the population.
Table A1. COVERAGE OF THE DATASET, MANUFACTURING: NUMBER OF FIRMS; NUMBER OF EXPORTERS, EXPORT VALUE (2003)
ALL FIRMS EXPORTERS EXPORT VALUE
ASIA-COE Our dataset Coverage ASIA-COE Our dataset Coverage ASIA-COE Our dataset Coverage
Sector (Number) (Number) % (Number) (Number) % (billion) (billion) %
15 71345 8882 12.45 4927 2872 58.36 12.1 9.4 77.77
17 27762 6408 23.08 5681 3445 60.69 12.5 10.8 86.70
18 41615 6134 14.74 5035 2654 52.73 9.7 8.1 83.56
19 21985 4495 20.45 5688 2644 46.48 10.8 8.8 81.62
20 46584 3550 7.62 2458 978 39.79 1.5 1.3 83.88
21 4566 1951 42.73 1328 884 66.57 4.0 3.8 95.28
22 27344 7801 28.53 2164 1237 57.26 1.7 1.6 91.25
23 443 333 75.17 84 72 86.90 3.8 3.7 99.25
24 6127 3529 57.60 2595 1984 76.61 22.6 16.3 71.80
25 13084 5575 42.61 4422 2968 67.18 10.4 8.9 85.72
26 27230 6218 22.84 4522 2176 48.12 7.2 6.2 86.18
27 3814 1893 49.63 1335 1016 76.10 9.9 8.7 88.21
28 99519 19551 19.65 10280 5754 56.17 12.6 11.2 89.26
29 42391 14710 34.70 12128 8177 67.55 43.3 38.0 87.61
30 1976 822 41.60 262 185 70.61 1.5 1.3 91.19
31 18316 5315 29.02 3214 2128 66.30 8.1 6.6 82.12
32 8671 1665 19.20 911 608 66.85 5.2 3.7 71.02
33 22399 3073 13.72 1921 1355 70.68 4.6 3.9 85.18
34 1962 1122 57.19 918 687 74.84 17.8 15.3 85.86
35 4684 1541 32.90 819 475 60.81 6.7 4.9 73.84
36 50018 7873 15.74 8664 4193 48.42 12.1 10.4 85.96
Total 541835 112441 20.75 79356 46492 58.69 218.1 183.0 83.93
Notes: The Table reports, for 2003, the number of firms, the number of exporters and the export value by sector for the entire population of Italian
manufacturing firms (ASIA-COE dataset) and the limited liabilities firms (our dataset). Sector definition according to 2-digit NACE manufacturing
industries.
Table A2. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS, 2003
ASIA-COE Our Dataset
Mean Sd Observations Mean Sd Observations
Manufacturing Exporters
log number of employees 2.43 1.35 79356 2.85 1.32 46492
log export 11.61 2.74 79356 12.43 2.67 46492
Number of products 8.04 14.7 79356 10.8 17.0 46492
Number of destinations 8.77 12.9 79356 11.7 14.7 46492
Notes: The Table reports, for 2003, basic descriptive statistics for the entire population of
Italian manufacturing firms (ASIA-COE dataset) and for limited liabilities firms (our dataset).
29 
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2013.57R (Version révisée)
Distributions of firms by province
Figure A4 shows the geographical distribution of the number of firms (left panel) and of the share
of constrained firms (right panel) across Italian provinces. The darker a province in the map and the
higher the corresponding figure in the province.
Figure A4. Distribution across provinces of the number of firms (left) and of the share of FC firms (right).
Probit Goodness of fit
The 2SLS-IV estimator employed in the paper follows Procedure 21.1 in Wooldridge (2010). To
recall, the procedure entails a two stage estimator for the dummy endogenous variable model in
equation 1. First, estimate by maximum likelihood the binary response model P (FCf = 1|X,Z)
where X are firm level controls and Z the instrument, and obtain the associated fitted probabilities Pˆ ;
Second, estimate equation 1 by 2SLS-IV using the fitted probabilities Pˆ as instrument.
As explained in the main text, to build Pˆ we estimate by maximum likelihood the following probit
P(FCf=1 | X,Z) = Φ
(
δ1Z + X′fβ + f
)
. (3)
where the probability of being financially constrained is regressed on Z, the average number of new
branches opened annually between 1990-98, and on X, the set of firm level controls.
Although this IV estimator enjoys several good properties, the standard weak instrument diagnos-
tics fail in this context. We provide here a series of alternative assessment of the goodness of fit of the
probit, supporting the validity of the instrument.
The upper panel of Figure A5 reports separation plot (Greenhill et al., 2011), a simple visual
technique for assessing the predictive power of models with binary outcomes. Its main advantage is
that it does not depend on the often arbitrary choice of a probability threshold to distinguish between
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predicted positive and negative events. The separation plot reports on the x-axis the fitted probabilities
of observing a positive outcome Pˆ(FC=1) and it associates to each value of Pˆ the actual value of
the dummy FC. The starker the separation between the colored and uncolored areas the better the
goodness of fit of the model. As a reference of how the separation plot looks like when there is lower
predictive power, the bottom panel of Figure A5 reports the result for a model with only one control
(age in this case). The improvement in the prediction ability from adding relevant controls is clear-cut.
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Figure A5: PROBIT SEPARATION PLOT
In the main text (Panel B of Table 3) we report three other goodness of fit statistics: a standard
Adjusted-R2, the Brier score, calculated as BS = (1/N)
∑
(FˆC−FC) where FˆC is status predicted
by the model and FC the actual status, and the AUC scores. The AUC score measure the area under
the ROC (Receiver Operating Characteristics) curve. This curve represents the relation between the
false positive rate (FPR) of the model and its true positive rate (TPR). Ideally, one would like to have a
model with a TPR equal to 1 and a FPR equal to 0. In practice, the closer the ROC curve to the border
of the unit-length square, the higher the AUC score and the higher the ability of the model to forecast
the event under scrutiny. In Figure A6 we present the ROC curve from estimates of Equation 3, clearly
supporting a high predictive power of the model.
Yearly estimates
Table A3 reports results of estimates of the baseline regression model
ln EUVfpc,t = γFCf,t−1 + X′f,t−1β + µpc + fpc,t , (4)
performed separately on each year. The FC dummy coefficient is positive and significant in all years.
This shows that averaging the data over time has the only effect to smooth yearly-specific shocks,
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Figure A6: ROC PLOT
while the main result is preserved.
Table A3 - FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS AND (log) UNIT VALUE: IV-FE BY YEAR
(1) (2) (3)
2001 2002 2003
Second Stage on (log) unit value
Financially constrained firms dummy (FC) 0.753∗∗∗ (0.032) 0.627∗∗∗ (0.035) 0.486∗∗∗ (0.032)
log TFP 0.279∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.299∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.296∗∗∗ (0.003)
log number of employees 0.178∗∗∗ (0.003) 0.184∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.180∗∗∗ (0.002)
log age 0.038∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.035∗∗∗ (0.002) 0.040∗∗∗ (0.002)
log total assets -0.151∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.150∗∗∗ (0.002) -0.145∗∗∗ (0.002)
log gross operating margin -0.023∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.032∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.041∗∗∗ (0.00)
North dummy 0.101∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.106∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.116∗∗∗ (0.005)
Center dummy 0.100∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.103∗∗∗ (0.006) 0.114∗∗∗ (0.006)
Number of observations 1,091,249 1,196,947 1,168,909
Product-Country FE Yes Yes Yes
3 dgt sectoral dummies Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Second stage results, the dependent variable is (log) export unit value at the product-destination
level. Regression in column 1 estimated using 2001, in column 2 using 2002, and in column 3 using
2003. All the regressions include a constant, HS6 product-country pair fixed effects and 3-digit industry
dummies.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered at product-country level. ***: significant at the 1%
level; **: significant at the 5% level; *: significant at the 10% level.
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